Exelon and Calpine have filed a complaint at FERC to further raise capacity prices in the ISO New England Forward Capacity Auction

Exelon and Calpine seek to eliminate the requirement that capacity which qualifies for the new entry pricing provision of the ISO-NE Tariff, which allows a new entrant to lock-in a capacity price beyond one year, offer capacity at $0 during the term of the locked-in capacity price.

Since load is now compelled to guarantee that future capacity price, and is essentially contracting for the capacity long-term, ISO-NE requires new entry pricing resources to bid at $0 in subsequent capacity auctions during the term of their locked-in pricing.

Exelon and Calpine claim this "artificially" depresses capacity prices, but what they seek is the artificial inflation of prices by ignoring prior procurements of capacity and by making new entry pricing resources offer at illogical levels, given that load has already been compelled to commit to purchase capacity from the new entry pricing resource. While having new entry pricing resources offer at $0 undeniably reduces capacity prices, such an outcome is just and reasonable, since load, having been compelled to pre-purchase capacity, now simply needs less in the ostensibly "residual" capacity auction. Less demand means lower prices, all else equal.

In the height of irony, Exelon and Calpine complain that, "new entrants’ low offers into an FCA are not market-driven but market rules-driven in that they are a direct result of the special treatment afforded new entrants under the New Entry Pricing Rule." (emphasis by complainants)

The same thing could be said about the capacity market in toto, particularly the "demand", but Exelon and Calpine have no problem with other aspects of the market being dictated by rules, not behavior.

See More: Complaint in Docket EL15-23